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INSTITUTIONALIZING ETHNIC DEMANDS: FRAMING PROCESSES, 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND INDICATORS OF PARTY FORMATION IN 
COLOMBIAN ETHNIC MOVEMENTS 
 This thesis examines framing and mobilization processes in Colombian ethnic 
social movements.  I employ systematic process analysis to analyze the question of why 
indigenous social movement organizations have created viable ethnic party vehicles in 
electoral politics while black social movement organizations have failed in this endeavor.  
I find that fragmented framing in the black movement led to disunity and inhibited 
mobilization processes culminating in the inability to mobilize a loyal electorate.  This 
fragmentation was observed less in the indigenous case, resulting in a more unified 
movement with broader appeal to the indigenous electorate. 
 My research makes key contribution to the Latin American social movement 
literature by performing an analysis that compares the respective ethnic social 
movements in the region while also addressing ethnic party formation.  Much of the 
extant literature highlights one of these groups while paying only cursory attention to the 
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In 1985, Donald Horowitz wrote that “Nowhere is the reciprocal relation between party 
and society more evident than in ethnic politics” (Horowitz 1985: 291).  More 
importantly, he would add that ethnic cleavages often produced ethnic parties that served 
to play a great role in political organization. But speaking against Horowitz’s assessment 
was the state of Latin American ethnic politics at the time, an area in which few examples 
of ethnic party formation existed despite the notable ethnic diversity of the region.  It is 
this type of observation that led Pradeep Chhibber to note that ethnic party emergence is 
not only a function of the existence of ethnic cleavages but also of the politicization of 
that cleavage (1999).  Ergo, a multi-ethnic society was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for ethnic party emergence. 
In the years surrounding Horowitz’s statement, Latin America had experienced a 
surge in ethnic mobilization and a revival of calls for indigenous rights, a process that 
would continue for the decades to follow.  This rise in multicultural politics has been 
attributed to a variety of phenomenon in the region.  Justifications ranging from broad 
constitutional reforms to neoliberal economic policies are suggested to have politicized 
ethnicity for multitudinous purposes, including cultural preservation, resource control, 
communal rights to land, and territorial autonomy.  At the same time, and particularly in 
the 1990s, many Latin American party systems were undergoing periods of severe stress 
and decomposition (Van Cott, 2005).  This created a political climate ripe with 
opportunities for ethnic mobilization, as social movement leaders and followers had new 
reasons to organize and fresh demands to make to the state.  Moreover, the combination 
of party system stress and institutional reforms also placed those movements in position 
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to transform political mobilization into the creation of electoral vehicles.  Indeed, it has 
been noted elsewhere that ethnic party formation has taken place and that success stories 
can be found across Latin America (Van Cott, 2005; Rice, 2011). 
 Across Latin America two main ethnic minority groups have used new political 
opportunities to politicize ethnic identity; indigenous groups and Afro-Latin populations.  
Juliet Hooker (2005) cites a report from the Inter-American Development Bank that 
suggests both groups suffer from racial discrimination and “social exclusion,” the latter 
explained as the inability of a social group to participate socially, politically, culturally, 
and economically in society.  It is this fact that led Nelson do Valle Silva to comment that 
there were costs associated with not being white or mestizo, prices that were paid by both 
indigenous and black citizens (do Valle Silva, 2000).  Thus, both groups continue to seek 
amelioration of their respective standing in society, and areas for improvement are 
plentiful.1   
Interestingly, while wonderful studies of black collective claims have been done 
(Asher, 2009; Ng’weno, 2007) much of the focus on the progress of social movements 
and party formation in Latin America has been focused on indigenous populations.  It is 
once again Hooker who rightfully notes that “The work of scholars of indigenous 
mobilization in Latin America, while extremely useful for understanding the adoption of 
multicultural citizenship reforms…, is less helpful in explaining black exclusion” (2005: 
289).  This statement is incisive as it gets at an unfortunate gap in the study of ethnic 
politics in Latin America.  This gap is evident when we consider that there exists a less 
developed understanding of the effects of institutional and economic reform on black 
                                                 
1 Hooker (2005) notes that blacks and indigenous people suffered disproportionately from poverty, 
unsatisfied basic necessities, illiteracy, and a lack of health services. 
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social movements in comparison with indigenous movements, particularly in terms of the 
conditions that facilitate (or hinder) party consolidation out of those movements.  
Moreover, multicultural politics in the country is often viewed as indigenous politics, 
with the struggles of black Latin Americans frequently being overlooked or taking a back 
seat.  And second, it remains unclear how movements for black rights have deteriorated, 
advanced, or expanded into lasting political fixtures.  Thus, a key set of processes 
remains understudied.  This state of the study presents us with a call for more in-depth, 
comparative study between these social movements that can help give us a broader, more 
complete understanding of ethnic politics in the region. 
In Colombia, both of these ethnic groups are present and have made collective 
claims to government.  Some authors have astutely noted that indigenous claims to land 
rights, semi-autonomy, and representation in Colombia have been more successful than 
similar claims made by black communities (Arocha, 1994, 1998; Hooker, 2005).  Others 
have lamented the electoral failures and stagnation that can be observed in the Colombian 
black movement (Agudelo, 1999, 2002).  And one study went so far as to compare the 
impact of constitutional reform on black and indigenous rights, inclusion, and 
democratization processes (Van Cott, 2000).  But studies of this type, while valuable, 
leave the field wanting.  What remains undone is an in-depth comparison that seeks to 
explain how the black and indigenous movements have diverged from each other to the 
point that one exhibits broader mobilization, greater acquisition of collective rights, and 
higher levels of institutionalization.  In this paper, I propose to assist in closing this gap 
by conducting an detailed, systematic comparison of ethnic party formation out of ethnic 
social movements in Colombia.  I should make clear that my goals do not include a 
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comprehensive analysis of struggles for ethnic collective rights in the country.  Instead, I 
seek to identify what processes and conditions within Colombian ethnic movements were 
productive or inhibitive of ethnic party formation across the two movements.  Such a 
study has much to offer the sub-field and should be a welcome addition to other analyses 
of ethnic politics in Latin America. 
Research Design & Framework 
It has been noted elsewhere that most socio-economic indicators show Afro-Colombians 
faring equally as poorly as indigenous people across the region (Hooker, 2005).  And as 
previously mentioned, scholars have noted that indigenous claims to land rights, semi-
autonomy, and representation have been more successful than black claims (Arocha, 
1994, 1998; Hooker, 2005), while   others have analyzed the failure of black leaders to 
perform at the ballot box and present followers with a consistently viable option in 
elections (Agudelo, 1999, 2002).  Meanwhile, indigenous actors in the country have 
experienced far greater degrees of success in all of these aspects, despite comprising a 
smaller segment of the Colombian population (Van Cott, 2005).  An observation that 
drives this analysis is the fact that Colombia’s constitutional reform movement opened up 
the political system to various sectors of Colombian society that had theretofore not 
received equal representation as traditional political powers.  Thus, both groups were 
faced with a political opportunity in the broad state reform, an opportunity that opened 
the door for both groups to act in order to achieve unprecedented rights and 
representation.  It is for this reason that I assume a common political opportunity 
structure within the country for ethnic movements.  Skeptical readers might suggest that 
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a review of the entire landscape of opportunity would certainly reveal a mixed bag of 
political openings for each group, and thus that a common opportunity structure is a 
misinterpretation of reality.  This suggestion is not without merit.  Knowledgable 
observers would attest to the fact that indigenous groups were better situated at the time 
of reform to influence this process.  This critique notwithstanding, it is my assertion that 
a relatively open forum such as the National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nactional 
Constituyente; ANC) provided generally congruent opportunities to the two groups 
presented here.  Both indigenous and black social movement organizations were able to 
bring their demands and desires to the table, and the outcomes of this dialoge was 
affected more by the actions and strategies of each movement rather than an imbalance in 
opportunities.  In other words, I think a better explanation can be derived if we focus on 
movement dynamics rather than incongruities in institutional openings.  Moreover, most 
cross-country studies assess party formation in terms of comparatively permissive (or 
restrictive) institutional environments.  The single-nation study presented here seeks to 
step away from this type of explanation in favor of one that allows for a deeper delving 
into the  movements themselves.  Ergo, if disparate collective and electoral gains can be 
observed, then we should analyze ethnic framing and mobilization processes to explain 
diverging outcomes.  This understanding influences my research question, which is 
formulated as follows:  
RQ: How have framing processes and mobilization structures in Colombian 
ethnic movements led to a comparatively greater level of institutionalization in 
the indigenous case versus the case of black Colombians?   
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Taking this question under consideration, my goal here is to come to some approximation 
as to how the framing and mobilization capacities exhibited by indigenous Colombians 
allowed for the creation of electorally viable parties while the Afro-Colombian 
movement has not yet achieved this.2  What differences between the two might explain 
these outcomes?  Is this a question of black ethnicity not lending itself to politicization as 
well as indigenous identity?  I hope to address all of these questions in the sections that 
follow. 
My research design is a structured, focused comparison of two ethnic movements 
in one nation (Colombia) considered broadly as the indigenous and black movements.  
Thus, there are two cases under study within a single South American country.  By 
‘considered broadly’, I mean to say that the primary unit of analysis is the ethnic group 
rather than the social movement organization or party.  Naturally, in order to describe the 
ways in which specific movement organizations attempted to develop into electoral 
vehicles, there will also be data gathered that pertains to sub-cases within the unit of 
observation.3  Similar data for each case was collected in order to identify variables and 
test hypotheses, both developed from the extant literature on indigenous and Afro-
Colombian mobilization in Colombia as well as the social movement and political party 
literatures (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994: 45).  Therefore, the mode of explanation 
employed here is theory-oriented4 and employs the method of systematic process analysis 
                                                 
2 Following Van Cott (2005) I define a viable ethnic party as one whose electoral platform includes among 
its central demands programs of an ethnic or cultural nature and that exhibits consolidation and voter 
support to continue as a competitor in elections. 
3The justification for a broader unit of analysis is simply that the question at hand requires considering 
black organization at large for comparison with the same for indigenous actors.  That is to say, the taking-
off point of the study is prior to the formation of many of the organizations and parties mentioned here, 
making it difficult to analyze these smaller units over the entire time period. 
4 Hall refers to theory-oriented explanations as ones that construe “the task of explanation as one of 
elucidating and testing a theory that identifies the main determinants of a broad class of outcomes and 
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as laid out by a (2006).  In this method, the investigator begins by articulating the theory 
or sets of theories that identify the main causal variables that produce the specific 
outcomes to be explained while also detailing how the variables interact in the causal 
chain.  Next, the investigator delivers predictions about the patterns that will appear in 
observations before finally drawing observations from the cases under study that are 
relevant to the aforementioned predictions.  Multivariate statistical analysis was ruled out 
due to the small number of cases under study.  Nonetheless, the detailed case studies, 
combined with the systematic comparison of cases that exhibited different outcomes on 
the dependent variables, should deliver scientifically rigorous inferences about causal 
processes. 
Social Movement Framework 
In his seminal text Power in Movement, Sidney Tarrow creates a solid framework 
through which we can understand collective action.  Specifically, he notes that collective 
action takes many forms, the most common being activity that takes place within 
institutions and seeks common goals that society does not think twice about.  However, 
there is also contentious collective action, which “lies at the base of all social movements, 
protests, and revolutions” (Tarrow, 1998: 3).  Equally important, he notes that “collective 
action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to 
institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways 
that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Ibid: 3).  It is apparent that the ethnic 
movements that have taken place across Latin America are examples of contentious 
                                                                                                                                                 
attaches special importance to specifying the mechanisms whereby those determinants bear on the 
outcome” (2006: 25). 
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collective action, seeking to capitalize on broad constitutional reforms to gain access to 
institutions and make new, previously unfeasible claims. 
The social movement literature also expresses the importance of the framing 
processes, opportunity structures, and mobilizing structures.  McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald (1996) identify three sets of factors key to analyzing movements: 
1) Political opportunity structures: the changes in the institutional structure or 
informal power relations of a given system. 
2) Mobilizing structures: the collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. 
3) Framing Processes: the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion shared understandings of the world that legitimate and motivate 
collective action. 
 
This paper sees the interaction of this triumvirate of factors as crucial to making 
sense of movement dynamics.  As stated above, I seek to focus my analysis on two cases 
within the Colombian nation-state.  By focusing on a single nation, we gain a great deal 
of clarity via the long-appreciated tenet of parsimony.  That is to say, a single-state 
context allows for a comfortable assumption of constancy in political opportunity 
structures, particularly those created during periods of broad reform and institutional 
apertures.  Across the Colombian system we can observe similar processes of 
administrative decentralization, institutional realignment, and electoral engineering.  
Such an approach is conducive to a more reliable assessment of the interplay of the 
framing and mobilization variables, allowing inferences with greater causal reliability.  
Essentially, by taking political opportunity variables out of consideration, we succeed in 
removing the “why” side of collective action (opportunities) while paying greater 
attention to the “how” (framing and mobilization).  That is not to suggest that the 
interaction of structure and agency is by any means unimportant.  Any paper that seeks to 
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begin explaining ethnic party formation is required to give some credence to the 
importance of a debilitated party system, for example.  However, it is my contention that 
constitutional reform opened institutional doors to both indigenous and black actors 
relatively equally.  For this reason, the onus of explanation in this case falls upon the 
shoulders of the other two pillars of this theoretical framework while holding opportunity 
dynamics still.  This also allows for the movements to be judged on their own internal 
merits which should generate a more fruitful direct comparison, particularly in terms of 
attaching outcomes to movement specifics.  It must be noted, however, that while the two 
movements experienced a common opportunity in terms of institutional reform they also 
experienced contrasting institutional opportunities in the post-reform period.  This 
occurred in the face of different forms of reserved representation for the two groups, with 
the indigenous movement receiving representation in both legislative bodies (senate and 
chamber) while the black  movement received seats in only the chamber of 
representatives.  This resulted in disparate opportunities for party consolidation, as will 
be seen later. 
Parties & Party Systems 
In assessing the success of ethnic movements in terms of party formation, it aids us to 
establish what function the parties in question would putatively serve should they form.  
One of the better formulations that describes the basic purpose of parties was delivered 
by Lipset and Rokkan back in the 1960s.  In the introduction to their edited edition, the 
authors suggest that parties  
help to crystallize and make explicit the conflicting interests, the latent strains and 
contrasts in the existing social structure, and they force subjects and citizens to ally 
themselves across structural cleavage lines…Parties have an expressive function; they 
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develop a rhetoric for the translation of contrasts in the social and cultural structure into 
demands and pressures for action or inaction…Small parties may content themselves 
with expressive functions, but no party can hope to gain decisive influence on the affairs 
of a community without some willingness to cut across existing cleavages to establish 
common fronts with potential enemies and opponents (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). 
 
If we follow Lipset and Rokkan’s limning of party functions, it stands to reason that a 
key determinant of ethnic party formation and success lies in the ability to “crystallize” 
ethnic interests and demands while also giving expression to a coherent ethnic party 
platform.  In essence, they should determine common ethnic demands, articulate them to 
the ethnic group, and pressure government to act accordingly.  The presence of these 
processes serves to provide an indication of the broader movement’s capacity to have a 
lasting effect on governmental institutions and, as a consequence, its ability to 
consistently mobilize a loyal electorate. 
 While the aforementioned party functions are a key base for assessing formation 
and performance, we must also remain cognizant of the context within which ethnic 
movements seek to develop into electoral vehicles.  It has been noted elsewhere that 
parties in the region are crucial to the quality of democracy, producing stability and 
enhancing representation (Levitsky and Cameron, 2001). Moreover, the various 
institutional reforms that have been undertaken across Latin America in the last two 
decades all shared two common goals; deepening democracy and economic expansion.  
For party systems, this meant strengthening the link between parties and voters which had 
eroded over time (Ibid).  Van Cott (2005) noted that Latinobarometer respondents 
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reported a decline of confidence in parties from the 1998 survey to the 2003 survey.5  
This decline was connected with a tendency toward personalist politics that focused on 
single candidates and replaced more “organic” links between voters and parties (Ibid).  
This erosion of linkages was one of the key goals of broad institutional reform and the 
necessity to address these ills was met in many cases by an opening of party systems and, 
to a certain extent, the dealignment of traditional parties.6  It has also been noted 
elsewhere that such a circumstance provides an opening for ethnic movements to 
politicize cleavages and enter the realm of competitive politics (Maiz, 2003).  This may 
even be the case in institutionalized systems which historically exhibit fixed, stable party 
systems that become more fluid and inchoate due to institutional realignment 
(Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).  
 Per Samuel Huntington, “Institutionalization is the process by which 
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (Huntington, 1968).  If we 
extend Huntington’s assessment a bit further, it becomes clear that a party “can be 
considered consolidated if it has an identifiable voting base (party roots); becomes well 
known, if not universally accepted (legitimacy); and develops into an independent 
structure as opposed to a personalist vehicle (organizational structure)” (Rice, 2011).  
These criteria will be important when considering party consolidation and 
institutionalization in the cases considered here.  I should also make it clear that I do hold 
a clear distinction between party formation and the growth of a movement.  When I 
consider movement dynamics throughout this paper, I am referring to the framing 
                                                 
5 Van Cott (2005) noted that only 10-15 percent of respondents responded that they had “some” or “a lot” 
of confidence in political parties, down from 21 percent reporting “much” or “some” confidence in 1998.  
Colombia was among the countries with the highest “no confidence” responses. 
6 Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984) suggested that dealignment indicates a brief period of time in which 
the number of votes cast for dominant parties sees a considerable decline. 
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processes and mobilization capacities of each movement.  Party formation, on the other 
hand, refers specifically to the creation of electoral vehicles that seek to elect officials to 
public office.  In some cases, this means that the very organizations whose dynamics 
have been taken under consideration are backing certain individuals for elected office.   
The Colombian State as a Focal Point 
It should be noted that this analysis seeks to utilize the state as a focal point for two 
logical reasons.  First, I follow Yashar in her assessment of the state as a point of 
departure in ethnic relations.  Yashar notes that Latin American states “define who has 
political membership, which rights they possess, and how interest intermediation with the 
state is structured” (Yashar, 2005: 6, emphasis in original).  It follows that the state is 
paramount in the creation and management of identities within society.  Second, and 
following from Yashar’s last point on interest intermediation, the state is understood here 
to be the interpreter and receiver of political and social demands.  Thus, when ethnic 
movements make collective rights claims they are demanding them from the state.  It is 
for this reason that the current study considers movement success and continuation in 
terms of interactions with the state.  These interactions include making demands of the 
state (as well as state responsiveness to demands), organizational capacity in state 
sponsored elections, and the actions of movement actors within state institutions. 
The assumed role of the state as the recipient of demands also means that it has a 
hand in determining movement outcomes.  Thus, and as is mentioned in even greater 
detail below, an ideal way of interpreting the contrasting gains made by movements is to 
analyze the dynamics within a single case.  In other words, I plan to compare the 
successes and shortcomings of the two movements within the context of a single nation in 
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order to keep the political opportunity variable constant for the early stages of 
mobilization.  This will allow for a greater understanding of how social movement 
organizations (SMOs) are framing and mobilizing contention in the face of a common 
state apparatus.   
Variables and Concepts 
Building upon the social movement and party literatures, I have identified a set of 
variables that are important for examining the present question.  The independent 
variables are composed of structural and process-oriented variables identified within both 
literatures, as described above.  Based on this framework, the independent variables are 
as follows: 
IV1: Demographics and concentration of ethnic populations (mobilization 
structures) 
IV2: Shared understanding of ethnicity (indigineity/blackness) (framing 
processes) 
IV3: Unity and coherence of ethnic demands (framing processes) 
 IV4: Density of organizational networks (mobilization structures) 
  
For the purposes here, a “shared understanding of ethnicity” is understood as the ability 
of movement leaders to fashion a unified ethnic message to followers of what blackness 
or indigineity consists of.  Connected with this is the second IV, which refers to a clear 
set of agreed upon demands which motivate collective action.  The next two variables are 
linked to the mobilization structures variable set.  According to Foweraker (1995) dense 
organizational networks are likely to promote mobilization and enhance the success of 
those mobilizations.  This may be the case even when financial resources are limited, as 
is often the case in Latin American ethnic movements.  For this reason, the “density of 
organizational networks” variable has been added and is understood as the exhibition of 
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an extensive, hierarchical network of social movement organizations (Van Cott, 2005: 
43).  Thus, the presence of thin networks that are composed of a small (possibly single 
member) elite designates a lack of density in organizational structure.  The 
“demographics and concentration” variable is measured as the rural/urban composition of 
the ethnic group as well as how concentrated they are throughout the nation.   
 Extending from the party literature are the two main dependent variables that are 
under consideration.  First, I should restate that the understanding of basic party functions 
comes from Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) formulation.  Thus, any ethnic party that 
achieves lasting success will have “crystallized” ethnic demands and given expression to 
those demands en route to building a loyal voting base.  In order to assess success in 
achieving this function, the dependent variables are described as follows: 
 DV1: Ethnic party consolidation  
 DV2: Electoral viability of ethnic parties 
 
A party can be considered consolidated so long as it develops an independent structure, 
gains legitimacy among other actors, and has solid party roots (Rice, 2011: 176-77).  The 
foremost measure of party consolidation is the existence of a reliable voting base in the 
form of stable electoral data (Ibid).  In other words, a decrease in party votes will be 
considered to be a decrease in party consolidation and the deterioration of party roots.  I 
should also note that I follow both Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Rice (2011) in 
their conception of party consolidation as a continuum (more versus less consolidated) 
than a dichotomy (consolidated versus not consolidated).  It is my proposition that parties 
that exhibit an increased vote share in elections and greater organizational density are 
more consolidated than the parties that fail to do so. 
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According to Van Cott (2005: 18), electoral viability is the achievement of a 
sufficient level of voter support to continue as a competitor in multiple election cycles.7  
Thus, an electorally viable party will present candidates for election in multiple elections 
while not necessarily gaining seats in each of those elections.  I depart somewhat from 
this formulation as I consider electoral viability to denote a party that not only presents 
candidates for elections but also regularly elects candidates to national offices.8  The 
justification here is that electorally viable parties should not only present candidates for 
election in each cycle, but also be a potentially viable source of representation for voters.  
That is to say, they should present an option that presents electoral possibilities that are 
buttressed by a show of success in past elections.  I should briefly note that there was an 
initial intention to include a DV that would denote party formation.  However, upon 
closer review of electoral data it became clear that permissive rules allowed for a great 
number of parties to “form” in the sense of official recognition.  This was the case for 
both ethnic groups.  Thus, I decided to leave this variable out as there was not enough 
variation in outcomes to give any explanatory power to the IV’s.   
Hypotheses & Central Claims 
It is my expectation that certain patterns will be observed that illustrate the flow of 
causality within the collection of variables outlined above.  The hypotheses and claims 
presented here correspond to the causal maps presented in figure 1 (indigenous 
movement) and Figure 2 (Afro-Colombian movement).  Both causal maps begin with the 
common opportunity structure of constitutional reform and move on to identify the 
                                                 
7 I depart from Van Cott’s definition as she limits her understanding of electoral viability to local and 
regional elections and denotes parties with national level electoral success differently.  Nonetheless, the 
main idea behind electoral viability is used here. 
8 Van Cott denotes this as a “successful” party. 
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placement of the independent variables in the causal scheme before concluding with the 
dependent variables of electoral viability and party consolidation.  To repeat, it is my goal 
here to present a possible causal pattern that explains the divergent outcomes in the 
dependent variables while bringing forth the importance of all variables in conjunction 
with each other rather than the effect of each variable individually.  In other words, rather 
than discussing the effects of framing processes on producing electorally viable parties, I 
seek to follow a sequential causal pattern that builds upon the effects of each variable, 
advancing chronologically.  This being the case, and following Hall’s prescription, my 
first task is to present a justification as to why the variables play out in this fashion and 
what observations we should expect to make if this is indeed the case (Hall, 2006).9  
These hypotheses will then culminate with three central claims that are to be revisited 
throughout this analysis.   
 Each causal map begins with the common opportunity structure of constitutional 
reform.  This point of departure corresponds to my main assumption that constitutional 
reform opened political opportunities for both indigenous and black leaders to politicize 
ethnicity.  This is understood to be the case because the new social contract took up the 
task of altering the racial ideology of the nation from that of mestizaje to one that was 
multicultural and pluri-ethnic.  Thus, both movements were presented with a new 
opportunity to make legitimate and substantial claims to government that were rooted in 
ethnicity.  Therein lays the commonality of opportunity structures in the nascent stages of 
institutional reconfiguration.  But it is also at that stage (institutional aperture) that the 
movements begin to exhibit diverging paths.  I expect that observations of the two cases 
                                                 
9 Hall refers to the expectations primarily as predictions, however here I keep with the normal scientific 
language by referring to them here as hypotheses. 
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will demonstrate the effects of heterogeneous versus homogenous framing capacities and 
how this fragmentation limits the ability of elites to mobilize broad support and build 
dense organizational networks.10  Continuing from there, I expect to uncover information 
that illustrates how the two movements were able to capitalize on contrasting institutional 
opportunities which took the form of disparate forms of reserved representation.  I expect 
to show how all of this culminates with the contrasting outcomes of the movements in the 
dependent variables, not simply because we see these disparate outcomes, but because of 
the nature of the disparity and how it is manifested in data drawn. 
 If framing issues are indeed the initial variable of importance, we should observe 
in the two cases a key dissimilarity: the ability versus the inability to mold a common 
sense of ethnicity and a commonly accepted set of ethnic demands.  Thus, we should 
observe a successful linking of cultural traits, ethnic characteristics, and even territories 
that are widely considered indigenous to indigenousness.  Stated simply, these items 
should be viewed as indigenous by indigenous people.  As the counter-example, we 
should expect to see black movement leaders largely fail to succeed in communicating a 
coherent sense of black culture and black identity, or at least one that frames a legitimate 
image of blackness that most Afro-Colombians can identify with.  Moreover, these 
contrasts should also be manifested as uneven capacities to articulate a set of demands 
representative of the issues that pertain to the majority of the ethnic community.  Ergo, 
we should see one movement with a more varied and incoherent set of issues while the 
other will have a narrower, cogent, and palatable ethnic agenda. 
                                                 
10 By homogenous versus heterogeneous framing, I mean that the overall movement exhibited a greater or 
lesser degree of unity in the framing of ethnicity, issues, and demands.  This should not be understood to 
imply that either movement was entirely unified or fragmented at any point in time.  Homogenous implies a 
greater degree of unity while heterogeneous implies a greater degree of fragmentation. 
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 I hold that the framing issues discussed above have a direct causal impact on the 
ability of the respective movements to mobilize a loyal and passionate following.  More 
specifically, the inability to successfully frame a unified notion of ethnicity should be 
observed in the black movement in the form of continued support for traditional parties, a 
condition that reflects the inability of black organizations and leaders to broadly connect 
black Colombians with putatively black issues.  Alternately, indigenous leaders should 
demonstrate the ability to wrest votes from traditional parties as they present an option 
that speaks to broad swaths of Indian voters.  Additionally, the fragmentation that comes 
out of poor framing will be observed in the form of individually driven political 
movements with thin organizational networks.  The opposite should be observed in 
indigenous organizations whose unified framing provides a strong support base that 
motivates aspiring leaders to remain loyal to the larger movement as it offers them 
opportunities for political advancement into the future.  This factor results in the creation 
of hierarchies and denser organizations. 
Taking these hypotheses and observations into consideration, an analysis of the 
indigenous and black movements in the Colombian case leads me to make two key 
claims: 
1) The black movement in Colombia has been less successful in building viable 
ethnic parties due to internal fragmentation and the lack of a unified voting 
base. 
2) This lack of unity is caused by the inability to frame the movement around a 
commonly accepted perception of blackness and black demands than the one 
adopted by indigenous social movement organizations.  
 
In accordance with these assertions, I hold that framing processes directly impact 
mobilization processes which in turn have a direct impact upon electoral outcomes for  
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ethnic actors.  It is for this reason that I have given a chronological order to the causal 
flow, as I perceive framing processes in this case to occur a priori to mobilization.  I 
should note that my intent is not to make a broad argument that mobilization is always a 
function of framing.  Indeed, such an order can easily behave inversely.  However, in the 
case presented here the opportunity structure demanded that groups first frame ethnic 
identity for the purpose of establishing a set of ethnic demands.  This then affected (and 
continues to affect) the behavior of mobilizing structures and their ability to form 
electoral vehicles. 
 The remainder of this paper will focus on substantiating these claims and 
providing explanations of the variation in the dependent variables.  I expect such a 
detailed account to provide a rich understanding of movement dynamics, sources of 
strengths and weaknesses, and provide direction toward generating causal explanations of 
diverging outcomes.  This analysis will be comprised of four main sections.  First, I 
establish the background of the study which includes a review of race and ethnicity in 
Latin American and Colombia as well as the causes of the surge in ethnic mobilization 
across the region.  Next, I discuss constitutional reform as a political opportunity 
structure that is common to both groups and which provided political space for both sets 
of actors to gain access to government.  The third section engages with the explanatory 
variables which are argued to produce the variation in the dependent variables, framing 
processes and resource mobilization processes.  In this section observations are made that 
seek to establish the causal flow laid out in figures 1 and 2.  Also included in this section 
is a discussion of outcomes which seeks to link the independent variables to the 
dependent variables by demonstrating electoral outcomes and analyzing the hypotheses 
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presented.   In other words, I make an attempt at explaining outcomes by connecting the 
dynamics of framing and mobilization to the electoral outcomes observed.  Finally, I 
close with a comprehensive conclusion that recaps the study, identifies overlooked 
aspects, and prescribes direction for future study. 
 
Race and Ethnicity in Latin America and Colombia 
Conceptions of race during the colonial period in Latin America were largely rooted in 
European racial ideologies that identified certain races with a natural inferiority (Graham, 
1990).  Equally important in this perception was an aversion to race mixture, as it was 
thought to have deleterious effects on whiteness (Wade, 1993).  It was these scientifically 
backed formulations of race that justified the continuation of black slavery and 
established a racial order that placed white Europeans at the apex of a top-down 
hierarchy.  Thus, during the colonial period the ethnic condition of the individual 
determined his legal status and social position (Morner, 1965).   
 Independence from the European mother countries came with an intellectual 
dilemma in the Americas.  On one hand, most Latin American societies were typified by 
racial heterogeneity while, on the other, they sought a continued integration with Europe 
(Graham, 1990).  This set of circumstances left Latin American elites in a difficult 
position, seeking to both maintain their European qualities while managing their own 
nation-building exercises in societies that were defined by race mixture and racial 
plurality (Ibid).  The resulting ideology would require a sense of dynamism that could 
express the continued, scientifically based superiority of whiteness over non-whiteness 
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while also making itself amenable to a sense of national identity and unity in their 
nascent nations. 
 The post-colonial situation was complex, exhibiting signs of both continuity and 
change.  European models of modernity and progress were not completely abandoned.  
Peter Wade remarks that in the Colombian context, racial mixture and black and Indian 
populations were harnessed to these models of modernization through the ideologies of 
mestizaje (race mixture) and blanqueamiento (whitening), providing a distinctly Latin 
American response to the dilemma (Wade, 1993).  “Blacks and especially Indians were 
romanticized as part of a more or less glorious past, but the future held for them 
paternalistic guidance towards integration, which also ideally meant more race mixture 
and perhaps the eventual erasure of blackness and indigineity from the nation” (Ibid: 11).  
In the desire for single race rhetoric, the mestizo was idealized.  A desirable society was 
one in which Latin American populations achieved a whitening of their populations, and 
it is here that we see the ideology of blanqueamiento put to work in a nationalist context.  
It is also here that seemingly contradictory forces find a place to coexist; discrimination 
situates itself with mestizaje, racial exclusion with racial inclusion.  It is this conjunction 
between mestizaje and blanqueamiento that have defined race and ethnic relations in 
Colombia.  
A more complete understanding of racial subjectivity in Colombia can be 
acquired by conceptualizing it as a pyramidal hierarchy.  The pyramidal race structure is 
an idea that Wade (1993) touches on, although he fails to do so at any significant length.  
Despite its cursory appearance in Wade’s work, I perceive this visualization to be 
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important to understanding the racial hierarchy.  The ensuing analysis acts upon the 
following diagram: 
 
    White (pure)   \ 
            \ 
           Mestizo   *Fluidarity (flux of identity) 
   Indigenous    \  
   Black         \ 
 
The first aspect that should be noted is the apex of the pyramid.  It is in this zenith that 
white purity resides (sangre limpia), having been situated there by the colonial and post-
colonial racial discourse that champions it as the highest standing in the racial caste 
system.  As we move down the hierarchy we begin to distance ourselves from white 
purity, first running into the mestizo who, again, is putatively the desired end point of our 
discourse of racial mixture (keeping in mind that it is the lighter side of the mestizo that 
is admired).  Fixed directly below the mestizo is the indigenous subject and, finally, as 
we approach the base of the pyramid we find the situation of black Colombians.  This is 
important for two main reasons.  First, Wade’s investigations establish that 
indigenousness was viewed as an ethnic category with a greater connection to mestizos 
and Europeans than Afro-Colombians.  Also, the placement of Afro-Colombians affirms 
the desire of Colombian society to exclude them to an even greater extent.  Thus, there 
are long-held perceptions across the country about the kinds of racial subjects and 
potential citizens that blacks and Indians, one being casted beneath the other. 
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 In her assessment of “negritude” in Colombia, Nina de Friedemann (1984) is 
quick to ascribe a quality of “invisibility” to black populations in Colombia.  She asserts 
that a lack of discoverability has historically typified the black experience in Colombia, 
not only because of exclusion from the white world but because of a racial monologue 
that largely ignored their existence.  This articulation of blackness is not exclusive to 
Friedemann (Wade, 1993; Whitten, 1998).  Jaime Arocha is particularly insightful here as 
well.  When speaking of the universality of mestizaje’s racial ideology, he notes that 
 
In 1890, Law 89 opened the possibility for one exception, that of the “savages,” who 
were allowed to retain their forms of land tenure and government while Catholic 
missionaries completed their task of integrating them into Christian Civilization.  As time 
passed, Colombians perceived themselves in binary terms, as “us” and “others” (indios), 
while Afro-Colombians were left in a semantic limbo that approached invisibility 
(Arocha, 1998: 73). 
 
Arocha goes on to note that while the indians (indios) were being “Christianized” they 
were allowed special reserves (resguardos) on which they could live and continue an 
indigenous cultural experience.  These revelations are crucial to understanding race and 
ethnicity in Colombia; Indians were historically recognized as a distinct out-group in 
Colombian society, while black Colombians were entirely excluded from the national 
imagination, largely assumed to have been engulfed in the mestizo culture. 
 Wade is also informative on this topic.  He explains that in Colombia, blacks were 
not thought of as a distinct group to the same extent as indians because acculturation 
allowed them to have adopted the mestizo culture that indians had not been able to adopt, 
due to their status as savages.  Afro-Colombians “have been seen much more as second 
class citizens…and often assumed not to have a ‘black culture.’” (Wade, 1997: 21).  In 
contrast, part of the identity of indians was to have distinct cultures and languages (Ibid).  
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In one sense, it is as if black Colombians benefited from more inclusion, as cultural 
assimilation would have us believe that they were being included in the national 
conversation.  However, this misses the fact that they were seen as an acculturated group 
while being an excluded minority.  It is largely for this reason that indigenous people 
were able to establish a sense of cultural difference that blacks would later have to 
struggle to achieve. 
Background and Context of the Case 
The Colombian example is both ideal and significant for various reasons.  First, it has 
been noted that Colombian Indians were the first to form viable ethnic parties after the 
institutional reconfiguration that came out of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente 
(ANC).  These successes made them models for indigenous leaders in other nations, both 
in the organizational and inspirational sense (Van Cott, 2005).  Second, Afro-Colombians 
also have a history of struggle, dating from the times of rebel slaves who formed 
palenques, or fortified slave communities (Wade, 1993).  Moreover, the dynamics of 
race, including the history of mestizaje, have played out similarly in Colombia as they 
have in the rest of Latin America (Miller, 2004).  These factors, along with the existence 
of vibrant ethnic movements that are representative of both indigenous and black 
populations, make the setting ripe for a substantial and instructive comparison.   
 The structural and institutional transformations (most notably neoliberal economic 
policies and constitutional reform) that have taken place in Colombia have taken place 
across Latin America.  Therefore, the country is representative of region-wide 
transformations that serve to define the political process of Latin America.  Specifically, 
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the case gives insight into the process of democratization throughout the region.  Van 
Cott articulated it nicely, stating that Colombia represents “the transformation of an 
unconsolidated democratic regime into a distinctly different model of democracy via a 
radical constitutional reform guided by normative criteria” (Van Cott, 2000: 3).11  What 
this means is that in order to further consolidate democracy in Colombia, constitution-
makers saw the necessity to transform the state, particularly in terms of the organization 
of its territories and the functions of the legal system.  More importantly, in the years 
following Colombia’s National Constituent Assembly, fellow Latin American systems 
have also adopted similar sets of reforms in order to deal with similar issues.12  All share 
some key emphases, including recognizing ethnic diversity, strengthening the protection 
of rights and the rule of law, and opening spaces for popular participation (Van Cott, 
2000).  These facts strengthen Colombia’s status as a useful example from which we can 
gain insight into both Colombian ethnic politics and Latin American ethnic politics as a 
whole.  Otherwise stated, upon analyzing movement dynamics and party formation in 
Colombia, we will be better equipped to assess the successes and failures of ethnic 
integration and participatory expansion in neighboring states. 
Early Motivations: Causes of Ethnic Political Resurgence 
A common regional theme in 1980s Latin America was the persistence of social crises 
that had vast impacts on the relations between civil society and the state.  The efficacy of 
Latin American institutions was widely questioned while the legitimacy of state 
governments was under the same assault.  In order to deal with these crises, the response 
                                                 
11 Van Cott (2000) was actually referring to both Colombia and Bolivia as she used both cases in her book. 
12 Constitutional reforms and replacements were created in Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993), Argentina 
(1994), Bolivia (1994), Nicaragua (1987, 1995), Brazil (1988, 1994, 1997), Chile (1994, 1997), Costa Rica 
(1997), Uruguay (1997), and Ecuador (1998). 
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by many states in the region was to engage in restructuring processes that would affect 
institutions and citizens alike while redefining the politicization of daily life.  The 
prevailing climate, dictated largely by past experiences with failed import-substitution 
models, led state technocrats to pursue neoliberal economic restructuring policies that 
would open borders to international markets and investment, reduce the size of the state 
apparatus, and focus on governmental efficiency.     
 While variation across Latin American cases can be observed, neoliberal 
restructuring projects had a distinct set of generalizable effects that altered the tune of 
political and social organization.   Latin American governments had the desire to 
decrease the size and scope of government while decentralizing their political systems 
(Weyland, 2002; Falleti, 2006).  They also wanted to expand democracy, ensure rights, 
and foster social cohesion among diverse populations (Iaies & Delich, 2009).  
Concomitantly, and somewhat paradoxically, these downsized states also had to broaden 
their capacity in certain areas to ensure access to underdeveloped lands, territories, and 
regions in order to pursue development goals.   As a result, neoliberal policies had great 
effects upon rural ethnic and racial minorities who often inhabited the rural, 
underdeveloped lands in question.  This led to a host of social and political issues for 
many minority populations which included challenges to autonomy, livelihood, and 
resource control (Brysk & Wise, 1997).  For this reason, it follows that neoliberal policies 
ended up having radical effects on what Sydney Tarrow would refer to as the “repertoires 
of contention” that ethnic social movement organizations would employ when framing 
movements and making demands to the state.  Postero and Zamosc further detail the three 
main ways in which neoliberal reforms affected ethnic populations:  
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1) Political restructuring, which has changed relations between Indian groups 
and the state. 
2) A new emphasis on resource extraction schemes, which has threatened 
indigenous lands. 
3) Economic restructuring, which has caused drastic economic crises (Postero & 
Zamosc, 2004). 
It was in response to these threats that ethnic movements generated a renewed fervor after 
decades of limited activity (Young, 1976).13  Moreover, this restructuring of the state was 
accompanied by a trend of broad constitutional reforms across Ibero-America. Thus, 
there are three combined pressures brought on by broad reforms that motivated a surge in 
ethnic politics throughout the region; structural conditions characterized by nascent 
threats to ways of life and culture, the reconfiguring of Latin American nations as multi-
ethnic in nature, and broad institutional realignments.  These political opportunities are 
largely responsible for ushering in an era of politicized ethnic identities. 
 The same tensions that grind throughout Latin America are equally present within 
Colombia.  In the 1960s, latinfundismo in the country gave way to neoliberalism as the 
main ideological structure of society (Rathgeber, 2004).  As the ANC was undergoing its 
process of reforming the Colombian state, neoliberal structures were being deepened 
throughout the country.  More importantly, they certainly would not be left out of the 
reform conversation.  Rather, the reformed constitution is highly reflective of neoliberal 
desires.  Rodrigo Nunes aptly notes that “Pre-assembly discussions coincided with the 
approval of Gaviria’s economic reforms, which were elaborated by an economic team of 
mostly young economists with American degrees and few, if any, ties to political 
organizations” (Nunes, 2007: 13).  A group of technocrats was therefore responsible for 
                                                 
13 Young’s 1976 review of ethnicity in Latin America revealed that indigenous populations were not 
forceful actors in Latin American politics, particularly at the national level. 
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the implementation of policies that supported the then “fashionable” recommendations of 
multilateral agencies such as the IMF and World Bank (Ibid: 13).  Furthermore, the 
involvement of technocrats without official ties to parties should lead us to believe that 
these policies were enacted by a political minority, actions that run counter to the 
pluralist wording of certain sections of the constitution.   
 As a result of these circumstances, the 1991 Constitution is deeply imbued with 
unambiguous neo-liberal rhetoric which supports further opening of the Colombian 
economy to foreign markets and capital and the creation of an “efficient” state.  The 
document established the creation of an independent central bank (Article 371), 
abandoned the state’s monopoly over public services (Article 336), enhanced the role of 
regional entities in the provision of public services (Article 356), and endowed the state 
with the responsibility of promoting the internationalization of economic relations 
(Article 226).  It also contains clauses that advocate spending for the establishment of the 
Estado Social (Social State), however, “critics have pointed out that the constitution does 
not preclude the justification of neo-liberal policies based on constitutional precepts” 
(Nunes, 2007: 15). 
Materially speaking, this economic apertura brought dramatic reductions in 
import tariffs, privatization of state-owned assets, the elimination of many protectionist 
measures, and the entering of economic trade unions to facilitate free trade (Aviles, 
2001).  In addition, neoliberalism is often seen to be an outcome of the politics of elite 
agro-industries in Colombia (Ibid).  This being the case, these policies often sought to 
open new possibilities for agricultural and land-owning elites to extract Colombian 
resources, particularly those located in rural parts of Colombia, often on land worked and 
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inhabited by ethnic minorities (Ibid).   Writing on this subject, Rathgeber rightfully notes 
that “The eagerness to commodify all aspects of life, and to exploit natural resources 
without bounds affects even the most remote communities” (Rathgeber, 2004: 107).  
These assaults proved to have great effects on ethnic communities and in very specific 
ways.  The government of Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) gave private companies the ability 
to extract raw materials on communal lands, despite legal restrictions that putatively 
protected against this (Ibid).  In a move that would particularly affect the black 
communities, the following administration of Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) modified the 
mining law of the country, implementing a Mining Code that removed power from the 
established mechanisms of consultation and participation with the affected communities 
(Ibid).  “Since 2000…all impact evaluation procedures have been reduced to a single 
environmental license, transforming what was once a coordinated and participatory 
process into a simplified pro-forma process.  This threatens the provision of the national 
constitution and international agreements…which protect indigenous territorial 
autonomy” (Rathgeber, 2004: 107).   
In essence, Colombian government found itself on a direct path for minimizing its 
interference into the economy, except to facilitate the movement of capital and foreign 
investment.  At each turn, political and social reforms have been inextricably linked to 
neo-liberal policies, a pairing which symbolizes new processes in the nation-building 
exercise.  Anthropologist Jason Antrosio keenly notes that the state has become an 
impartial “promoter and arbiter of the economic market” while it “similarly proclaims 
neutrality with respect to national identity” (Antrosio, 2005: 201).  In Essence, it has 
altered its past social policies to facilitate the intermingling of social life and a desired 
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economic path based in tenets of modern, western development.  That is not to suggest 
that neo-liberal reforms are value neutral or do not privilege certain sectors of society 
over others.  It is obvious that the action of promoting an open market benefits the 
business class and business interests over the working class.  Moreover, the reduction of 
the size of the state means a sacrifice in services for certain sectors, burdens that often 
fall heavily on the working class and peasantry.  What I do mean to say is that, while 
egalitarianism has not been promised, it would appear that all sectors possess equal 
possibilities for the enjoyment of their rights, including ethnic minorities.  How this 
appearance would translate into reality was far less clear. 
These socio-economic phenomena are functions of a reformed system that seeks 
to establish and solidify the universal principles of the western tradition, principles that 
many ethnic actors saw as fundamentally opposed to their interests.  One author noted 
that “indigenous cultures do not value the ethos of private accumulation or individual 
achievement that underpins capitalist society.  The good of the community is almost 
universally considered more important than the good of the individual…” (Van Cott, 
2000: 11).  This accentuates an important fact; ethnic actors in Colombia, and Latin 
America more broadly, were struggling against not only the material impositions of 
neoliberalism, but also the western, individualistic, Liberal culture of neoliberal policies 
that were tied constitutional reform.  This was the setting in which ethnic social 
movement organizations and their followers would be moved to action and generate 




The History and Development of Black SMOs 
Gaining a full understanding of the dynamics of the each movement requires delving into 
to the histories of the respective social movement organizations.  For Afro-Colombians, 
the most notable among these are the United Peasant Association of the Atrato River 
(Asociación Campesina Integral del Río Atrato; ACIA), the Process of Black 
Communities (Proceso de Comunidades Negras; PCN), the Organization of People’s 
Neighborhoods and Black Communities of the Chocó (Organización de Barrios 
Populares y Comunidades Negres de Chocó; OBAPO) and Cimarrón.  Of particular 
importance are the interactions between these organizations and the Colombian state, as 
well as the role that each sought to play in black “ethnicization” process during the 
reform period. 
 In the 1980s, residents of the predominantly black department of Chocó 
experienced heightened pressures on their resources when the department’s political 
administration gave large concessions to private logging and mining companies (Asher, 
2009).  It was during this period that ACIA was born and emerged as a leading 
association of black Colombians in the area (Agudelo, 2001).  After organizing an 
ultimately unsuccessful forum in the town of Buchadó, Chocó, the ACIA sought to 
broaden its reach across the region while refining its strategies.  To achieve this, ACIA 
drew on the experience of OREWA (Organización Regional Emberá-Waunana del 
Chocó), the regional organization of the Emberá indians (Asher, 2009).14  This change in 
strategy altered ACIA´s earlier land claims, which were more traditional peasant land 
                                                 
14 During interviews conducted in1995, Asher was informed by ACIA leaders that they had also received 
advice from OREWA legal advisers and consultants. 
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claims (Agudelo, 2001), to claims that were couched in ethnic and environmental 
language (Asher, 2009).15 
 With its origins in the 1970s, the Movimiento Nacional Cimarrón (commonly 
known as Cimarrón) is among the oldest and best known black organizations in 
Colombia.  The group was formally established in 1982 and during this decade selected 
Juan de Dios Mosquera as its leader (Wade, 1995).  Cimarrón emerged from a radical 
leftist study group and established a hub in the town of Pereira along with centers in other 
urban locations across Colombia (Ibid).16  Asher (2009) explains that the organization´s 
key objectives were to: 
1) Draw attention to the discrimination and oppression of marginalized groups, 
especially blacks. 
2) Struggle for equality and universal human rights of subordinated groups all 
over the world, including blacks, workers, and women. 
3) Be in solidarity and form alliances with other black struggles, such as the 
antiapartheid movement in South Africa, civil rights efforts in North America, 
and négritude movements in the Caribbean and Francophone Africa. 
 
It is important to understand that the word cimarrón in Spanish refers to a domesticated 
animal that has run wild and that the term was applied to runaway slaves who built 
fortified slave colonies referred to as palenques (Wade, 1995). Cimarrón (the 
organization) thus represents a history of cimarronaje, in which palenques are viewed as 
symbols of cultural resistance and a struggle for human rights.  This ideology “invites 
people to connect certain aspects of their phenotype (their physical ‘blackness’) to a 
history of oppression that is initially national but also continental and even global” 
(Wade, 1995: 344).   
                                                 
15 For a more detailed account of this shift to ethnic and environmental claims see Asher 2009, pp. 38-39. 
16 Wade (1995) listed Manizales, Quibdó, Cali, and Bogotá as urban centers with Cimarrón organizations. 
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 Toward the end of the 1980s, black Colombians saw the emergence of two more 
key organizations in OBAPO and the PCN.  OBAPO originally sought to mobilize 
Quibdó shanty town residents and several other coastal communities (Asher, 1999)17 and 
would play an important role in lobbying on behalf of Afro-Colombians during the 
development of Transitory Article 55 and Law 70 (Agudelo, 2001).  In its early stages, 
the PCN was known as the Organización de Comunidades Negras (OCN).  In somewhat 
of a contrast to OBAPO, the OCN was started in an urban setting but focused on 
mobilizing rural communities in the Pacific (Asher, 2009).  During the mobilization 
process, OCN members began to developing a vision for a national black movement that 
they thought fit the contemporary economic and political changes that were occurring in 
the country.  This vision was influenced by intellectual debates that discussed the role of 
culture in contesting state power and the accepted forms of development.  The OCN´s 
aim was to propose a model of development that was “ethno-culturally” appropriate for 
the Pacific region and that would emphasize the importance of everyday cultural 
practices of black communities (Asher, 2009).  In 1993, during the third National 
Conference of Black Communities, the group changed its name to the Process of Black 
Communities (PCN) to emphasize the process of black struggles in Colombia, struggles 
that continued beyond the recognition of rights and into the phases of implementation 
(Ibid).  It was at this point that they also outlined a fresh set of goals.  According to 
Asher, these were: 
1) To organize a broad, grassroots-based black social movement based on 
diverse Afro-Colombian identities and interests. 
                                                 




2) To envision a political strategy that would enable organized black 
communities to make autonomous decisions regarding their livelihoods. 
3) To develop culturally-appropriate, ecologically-sustainable models of 
economic development. 
4) To establish autonomous territorial control over the Pacific. 
 
Even the casual observer can easily note the combination of a lack of specifics and 
ambitious scope.  In the short term, broad goals provided some common ground upon 
which different organizations could meet.  Extended connections would prove more 
tenuous, however, with various points of difference posing dilemmas for continued unity.  
First and foremost, and as will be highlighted in the ensuing analysis, there were chasms 
between groups in terms of the way that negritude (blackness) should be framed.   
The Development of Indigenous SMOs 
Colombia’s contemporary indigenous organizations emerged from the peasant land 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s.  These struggles often took the form of localized 
resistance and sought to recapture land from hacienda owners (Findji, 1992).  An 
important historical antecedent is the resguardo system of indigenous landholdings.  A 
resguardo is a communal landholding entity administered by annually-elected councils 
called cabildos (Dover and Rappaport, 1996).  Various attempts to dismantle the 
resguardo system in the nineteenth century motivated protectionist movements to 
preserve it (Ibid).18  Much of this resistance was originally done behind peasant 
organizations such as the National Association of Peasant Producers (Asociacion 
Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos; ANUC) which were not necessarily indigenous 
organizations but whom often represented the land claims of indigenous persons (Bagley, 
                                                 
18 Attempts to preserve resguardos were solidified with the guarantees to communal land tenure included in 
the 1991 constitution.  Until then, however, the resguardo was in continuous danger of disappearance due 
to the ongoing privatization of lands (Dover and Rappaport, 1996). 
40 
 
1989).  The eventual expansion of such plights to a larger scale eventually brought about 
the birth of various indigenous organizations that served to concentrate and strengthen 
indigenous struggle.  It was this type of expansion that gave birth to organizations such as 
the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia; AICO), the 
Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca; CRIC), 
and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (Organizacion Nacional de 
Indigenas de Colombia; ONIC).   
 CRIC emerged out of the farmers’ union experience in 1971.  The organization 
was formed when indigenous actors realized the uselessness of the union during times of 
land confrontation (Findji, 1992).  It was originally composed mostly of Nasa, 
Guambiano and Coconuco Indians from Cauca and professed two key purposes. First, the 
organization sought to further the struggle to regain traditional lands taken by haciendas. 
Second, it aimed to strengthen indigenous cultures (Van Cott, 2005).  Interestingly, the 
CRIC is an initial example of ethnic mobilization during a period in which class was the 
primary organizing principle.  In fact, it had no true “ethnic” vision at its inception. 
Rather, it was born out of terrajero struggles, a characteristic that was akin to class-based 
movements (Findji, 1992).  But eventually, these struggles started to be understood by 
minority sectors within CRIC as ethnic fights for “territory,” not just land (Ibid).  In fact, 
in 1971 CRIC’s charter was altered to include the defense of indigenous history, language 
and customs (Jackson, 2002).  This is an important development, as it is demonstrative of 
the importance of indigenous identity and the language of cultural exception rather than 
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the language of inclusion.  This occurred even in an organization such as CRIC that was 
less “traditional” in nature.19  
 While CRIC can be viewed as a regional movement of Cauca, it also helped to 
form a national organization in 1982 known as ONIC.20  It was that year that the First 
Indigenous Congress was held in Bogota and was attended by more than 2,000 
indigenous delegates across Colombia (Jackson, 2002).  ONIC’s charter included a 
mandate to defend indigenous autonomy, history, culture, and traditions while also 
seeking to continue the struggle of indigenous land recuperation (Ibid).  It is important to 
note that ONIC’s organizational structure was more vertical than horizontal.  This means 
that there was a national office with thirty-five regional affiliates that were created along 
departmental, rather than ethnic, lines (Ibid).  There is a clear intent behind such an 
organizational structure, as ONIC affiliates see their organization as a “supracommunity 
administrative level” that transcends territorial-based ethnicity (Jackson, 2002). 
 A rival, more traditional movement that was also based in Cauca was the 
Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia; AICO).  AICO 
was born in the 1980s out of Guambianos desire not to be seen as peasants (Jackson, 
2002).  The organization also aspired to be national in scope while, in contrast to ONIC, 
having a non-vertical hierarchical structure.  The former characteristic was exhibited in 
its membership alliance, which included the Emberá and Arhuaco, two pueblos located in 
other parts of Colombia.  The latter characteristic was a function of AICO’s desire to 
present a model distinct from ONIC’s, one that was not federated and placed more power 
                                                 
19 By less traditional, I mean an organization that ascribes less importance to indigenous authority 
structures such as the cabildos and instead focuses on a more vertical hierarchical structure. 
20 CRIC and ONIC were not the same entity and often times took different directions on issues and pursued 
different strategies.  CRIC, however, was partially responsible for ONIC’s creation and was an affiliate of 
this cross-regional, national-level organization. 
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in the traditional cabildos.  In fact, AICO openly criticized ONIC for being authoritarian, 
excessively vertical, and dismissive of traditional authorities (Jackson, 2002). 
  Two characteristics of indigenous movements are to be particularly noted.  First, 
the movements are not at all homogenous.  Rather, they are composed of diverse 
indigenous groups and exhibit organizations with varying organizational structures and 
strategies.  ONIC sees it lack of association with a given region as a distinct advantage 
while AICO vehemently sees such a national program to be destructive to traditional 
indigenous governing entities.  There is also a divide in the way indigenous identity is 
represented.  ONIC often employed a “trait list” of indigenousness that essentialize 
indigenous identity by associating native culture with discrete cultural traits (language, 
traditions, and social organizations) (Rappaport and Dover, 1996).  AICO, on the other 
hand, rejected such “outmoded” anthropological criteria in favor of the “romanticizing of 
indigenous resistance in an appeal to history as the prime definer of native identity (Ibid).  
The second key characteristic of these organizations speaks to a shared purpose, which 
becomes particularly salient in the ensuing analysis.  While their ethnic representations, 
organizational structures, and strategies may be distinct from one another, they both 
frame ethnic struggles in the language of cultural difference and a defense of indigenous 
territories.  That is to say, while cultural difference may be performed differently by 
organizational leaders, cultural difference as a defense of territory was a key part of the 
broader indigenous movement (Jackson, 2002).  I should make it clear, prior to moving 
on to the analysis below, that these qualities are of particular importance to the argument 
presented here.  During the National Constituent Assembly, as well as the years before 
and after, the indigenous movement was able to present a more unified, commonly 
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agreed upon set of basic demands than the Afro-Colombian movement.  Issues of 
territorial autonomy and cultural preservation were common.  We might view this in 
terms of a general outlook on ethnic politics.  Indigenous actors agreed upon a politics of 
difference and rights through exclusion, while some Afro-Colombian actors sought rights 
through inclusion, thereby creating a gap that was often difficult to bridge.  The framing 
processes for each movement were affected by this set of circumstances, with 
mobilization capacities soon following. 
Opportunity Knocks: Institutional Apertures 
Constitutional Reform and Immediate Impact on Race/Ethnicity 
Building on general social unrest, a fervent student movement known by the phrase 
Todavia Podemos Salvar a Colombia (We Can Still Save Colombia) issued a call for 
reform to political elites prior to the 1990 legislative elections (Dugas, 2001).  The 
students issued a manifesto which demanded that a plebiscite be included among the 
electoral mandates, a ballot measure that would express Colombians’ desire for 
institutional and social reform.  As Colombian voters were already being asked to 
consider candidates for six elective offices, the ensuing measure became known as the 
septima papeleta (seventh ballot).  Proof of public support for the septima papeleta was 
made apparent on March 11, 1990, when an estimated two million extra ballots were cast 
in favor of the measure, whose end demand was the creation of a National Constituent 
Assembly that would take up the task of creating a new constitution for the republic 
(Dugas, 2001).   
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 Although the seventh ballot was legally unconstitutional, its broad support was 
represented in electoral figures.  This ultimately culminated in an official plebiscite 
occurring alongside the presidential elections in May of the same year.  The Colombian 
Registrar counted 5,236,863 votes in favor of the creation of a National Constituent 
Assembly, a figure that would correspond to 86.6% of votes cast (Dugas, 2001: 810).  
Consequently, the incoming administration of Cesar Gaviria Trujillo shifted the 
conversation from whether or not an assembly would be created to what the composition 
of this body would be, gathering input from major political parties, political movements, 
influential organizations, and academics.  The assembly was composed of delegates that 
represented the most diverse social and political sectors of Colombia; workers, students, 
traditional political elites, as well as marginalized ethnic groups including indigenous 
populations and Afro-Colombians (Agudelo, 2001). 
 The 1991 Constitution produced by the National Constituent Assembly would 
engender the potential for new social and political spaces, giving many Colombians 
renewed hope.  Many viewed this event as a potential panacea that may serve to cure the 
ills of a conflict-laden society with a debilitated civic structure.  More importantly, ethnic 
minorities saw it as a political opportunity through which they might transform a history 
of exclusion.  This new hope was  tied into a rhetoric which championed inalienable 
rights of citizens against the state, political inclusion, respect for difference, and a sense 
of plurality which recognized the diversity that composed the Colombian nation.   
 The Constitutional Assembly generated a social contract that greatly contrasted 
the old structural framework.  This was particularly true for questions of race, ethnicity, 
and inclusion of minorities.  The pre-reform Latin American state was exclusionary and 
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included a “rigid, race-based class hierarchy and concentrated productive forces in the 
hands of a tiny elite” (Van Cott, 2000: 2).  Post-reform states, in contrast, sought to 
“extend the benefits of citizenship and the market to a larger proportion of the state and 
democratic regime (Ibid: 3). Thus, the post-reform state in Latin America was 
inclusionary, taking up the task of recognizing its pluri-ethnic, multi-racial make-up and 
integrating traditionally marginalized minorities.  This meant extending some existing 
legal recognition of indigenous peoples while for black Colombians it meant finally 
becoming “visible” in Colombian history and society (Arocha, 1998).21 
This development in the racial ideology opened a particular space in which ethnic 
and racial minorities could engage the state and reconstitute the relations that they shared 
with it.  This development is of great importance, as I hold it to represent the beginning 
of a common opportunity structure for both sets of ethnic actors in Colombia.  This 
transformation in the state approach to race translated to the possibility of re-forming 
identities, articulating ethno-racial claims, and securing collective group rights, thereby 
invigorating a new set of ethnic social movements and demands.  The impact of this shift 
cannot be overstated.  As Brysk explains, early ethnic movements avoided making 
collective appeals based on group rights as these were broadly rejected as challenges to 
sovereignty, thus being radical and treasonous (Brysk, 1994).  Therefore, the newfound 
ability to express collective claims (i.e. land, resources, and autonomy) delivered a great 
impact to what Sidney Tarrow calls the “repertoires of contention” that are available to 
these ethnic movements.  This is illustrative of the willingness of Colombian government 
to hear claims that theretofore were inaudible to the status quo.  Such an opening 
provided fertile ground for ethnic social movements to advance their agendas. 
                                                 




If the altering of the state racial ideology endows ethnic groups with a newly legitimized 
way of framing ethnic claims, institutional adjustments ultimately provided new avenues 
for ethnic groups to gain access to government.  As I briefly stated earlier, a debilitated 
party system can be credited (or blamed, depending on the angle taken) with creating an 
opportunity for the rise of ethnic parties onto the national scene.  Mainwaring and Scully 
took note of this in the 1990s, stating that Colombia’s traditional parties were highly 
factionalized, with party factions presenting their own set of candidates.  They would add 
that while traditional parties maintained a stranglehold on electoral politics, there was a 
big push by the left to challenge the “weak” and “eroded” traditional parties of 1990s 
Colombia (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995).  However, this circumstance is more important 
as a precursor to the key opportunity which existed in constitutional reform.  Thus, party 
debilitation is secondary to the explanation provided here.  Instead, this paper views 
ethnic challenges to traditional power structures to be a function of reserved spaces of 
political representation.  Both ethnic groups were able to secure reserved representation 
in legislative institutions.  Indigenous groups secured two seats in the Colombian senate 
as well as an additional seat in the chamber of representatives. Of great importance to 
Afro-Colombian populations was the acquisition of Transitory Article 55, which might 
also be described as a promise on behalf of the state that legislation would be later drawn 
up to address the needs and concerns of black communities.  The subsequent law that was 
later written by government officials, in negotiation with black leaders, was Law 70 (ley 
70), which would henceforth lay the framework for the collective black claims that would 
be deemed legitimate by the state, as well as the avenues through which they could be 
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pursued.  Particularly pertinent here is article 66 of law 70, which established two 
reserved seats in the chamber of representatives for “black communities” (comunidades 
negras).  This “black district” (circunscripcion negra) within the lower chamber of the 
legislature would become effective for the first time in the 1994 legislative elections.  
However, and as we will see later, the electoral figures of that election painted a bleak 
picture of the strength of a unified black vote, even coming off of the large legal victory 
that was law 70. 
General Outcomes of the ANC: Equal Opportunity? 
Before analyzing in greater detail the electoral outcomes between actors, it may be 
helpful to first identify some immediate contrasts exhibited by the two movements that 
can be observed after the ANC.  Table 1 delivers a visual of the key issues and outcomes 
that were prevalent for both groups, showing the disparities.  Many of these outcomes can 
be explained in the ethnic asymmetries that occurred during the National Constitutional 
Assembly (ANC).  During this process, the ethnic diversity of indigenous groups was 
substantiated by Constitutional articles 286 and 287, which established the framework for 
transforming the communal land reserves (resguardos) into indigenous territorial units 
that were to be as autonomous as municipalities (Arocha, 1998).  Arocha’s detailed 
account of the process for black communities is exceptional.  He states that 
  
…Transitory Constitutional Article 55 (AT55) was not only a scaled-down 
version of the innovations applicable to the indigenous communities but a 
temporary measure that could only apply permanently after Congress had passed 
what is now known as Law 70.  That law, in turn, had to be implemented by 
means of specific decrees to be submitted to President Ernesto Samper for 
approval.  To complete this long process, the executive had to appoint two high-
level commissions composed of leaders of the black movement, government 




One observer suggested that these results are indicative of an asymmetrical reform 
process that truly revealed the state’s intransigence in perceiving black demands as 
legitimate and equal to indigenous (Hooker, 2005).  This argument suggests that black 
movements were less successful in framing their claims to the state on the basis of black 
ethnicity.  To be fair, this assertion is not entirely without merit.  Arocha (1998) noted 
that the defense of Afro-Colombian ancestral territories was complicated by a lack of 
understanding generated by the complexity of the aforementioned legal decrees 
(Transitory Article 55, Law 70, and their predecessor laws).  Afro-Colombian community 
councils “must produce historical, demographic, economic, and cartographic studies of 
their communities” that none of the council members know how to collect.  Indigenous 
groups are also under these obligations, but there are government bodies that exist to 
assist them in data collection, thus facilitating their claims22 (Arocha, 1998).  These 
observations easily give one the perception that the state was generally less receptive to 
black claims, simply because their legitimacy was questioned, a notion that might suggest 
an opportunity structure that was actually unequal from the onset.  But this argument fails 
to reveal a key facet of the story.  I agree with Hooker that the initial problem has to do 
with how claims are framed.  My disagreement is in the audience to which attempts at 
framing claims was unsuccessful.  I hold that the reason for the belittling of black claims 
by government is due to the inability of the movement to frame claims to followers rather 
than government.  That is to say, the illegitimacy of black demands was not just a 
perception of the government apparatus, but of many Afro-Colombians themselves, a 
                                                 
22 Arocha does mention in later work that Afro-Colombians now receive similar assistance, although its 
comparability with that of indigenous groups is unclear. 
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large segment of whom also disagreed with the definition of legitimate black claims.  
This, in turn, led to the fragmentation of the movement and the inability of black elites to 
hold as much political leverage in reform discussions.  The result is a set of outcomes that 
reflect the higher position of indigenous groups.  Most importantly, all of this disrobes 
the weaknesses of black leaders to successfully frame and mobilize their respective 
movement.   
 
Table 1.1: Comparison of Indigenous and Black demands during constitutional reform 
period. 
Demand Indigenous Black 
Acceptance of Autonomy 
Claims 
Yes No 
Recognition of Legal 
Plurality 
Yes No 
Quotas in Legislatures Both Chambers (2 Senate, 1 
Chamber of 
Representatives) 
Chamber of Representatives 
Only (2 seats) 
 
Analysis 
Framing Processes: The Afro-Colombian Movement 
Peter Wade aptly noted the great deal of internal diversity in the black movement.  In 
particular, he points out that a large part of black organizations seek to take up the issues 
that are central to rural community councils of the Colombian Pacific which are formed 
to file land title claims.  On the other hand, there are also the urban movements who may 
or may not focus on peasant issues, as has been previously noted.  “As might be 
expected, these (organizations) vary widely in terms of their ideological stance vis-à-vis 
black identity and racism” (Wade, 2002).  This circumstance led to a variety of ways for 
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“blackness” to be “ethnicized” by leaders and organizations.  Organizations seeking to 
protect rural peasants, such as the PCN (Procesos de Comunidades Negras), sought to 
mold black identity around cultural difference and rights attached to traditional use of 
territory (Agudelo, 2002).  Other organizations, such as Cimarron, sought in many 
instances to adopt a racial framing that sought rights based in inclusion rather than 
difference.23  This point of view sought to appeal to the urban black population more so 
than the rural communities (Wade, 2002).  The 1994 and 1998 electoral cycles are 
demonstrative of the divisions that are present in the black movement.  Zulia Mena was 
voted in under the banner of the OBAPO (Organizaciones de Barrios Populares) while 
Agustin Valencia came in under a host of organizations from various parts of the 
southwest Colombia.  Again, these organizations do not necessarily have the same 
ideology, goals, or racial agenda.  While both were elected in 1994, these types of 
divisions prevented lasting success at the national level as they divided a black vote 
already confined by a lack of followers who could identify with the black movement.  As 
electoral data will show, this prevented the development of party consolidation as black 
parties never became a legitimate opposition to the traditional party structures. 
Agudelo (1999) noted that black rural populations, and the organizations that 
served them, tried to mimic what had worked for indigenous sectors.  It would appear 
that the success of riverine and mining communities in articulating this brand of black 
ethnic rights had some deleterious, albeit unintended, effects on the black movement as a 
whole, particularly in terms of building a lasting national electoral presence.  In order to 
acquire support and effectiveness, black organizations have had to focus on localized 
                                                 
23 The movement objectives of both Cimarron and the PNC laid out in the previous section provide greater 
detail as to the nature of these differences (pp. 37-38). 
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issues and politics.  While this may lend itself well to mayoral or possibly even 
departmental politics, at the national level it has led to the inability to mobilize a broad, 
unified voting base.  Moreover, black organizations have suffered from a dearth of 
leadership and qualified candidates, again due to the inability to resist being siphoned 
away by the Colombian Liberal Party.  Agudelo is quite clear in stating that the history of 
Liberal Party domination in the black region of Colombia has proven intransigent.  Thus, 
the traditional problem of clientelism is alive and well while the development of nascent 
parties is vastly hindered (Pardo, 2002). 
To translate the black experience into the language of McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald, the conscious strategic efforts of black activists to frame ethnic rights around 
concepts like territorial rights, cultural preservation, and resource control was indeed 
successful in legitimating and motivating collective action.  However, this mobilization 
was largely limited to the rural populations of the Pacific littoral.  Many urban black 
Colombians were not motivated to action and many even continued to reject “black 
politics” (Wade, 1995).  Even Cimarrón’s message of resistance and suffering often 
failed to resonate with them and many still viewed the racial mixing process as a 
democratizing one (Ibid).   Moreover, the failure to develop a cohesive framing that 
legitimated action for a broader support base led to an absence of coherent goals across 
organizations and long-term political objectives.  The result was competition among 
movement actors for state resources, the distribution of resources to pockets of supporters 
(clientelism), and a form of institutionalization that included the swallowing of the Afro-
Colombian movement by the traditional parties (Pardo, 2002).  Pardo articulated it quite 
well when he stated that, “Faced with a lack of organizational flexibility and ideological 
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consistency, the results obtained by the movement in the institutional setting serve to halt 
its development and even reverse it” (Pardo, 2002, my translation).  What Pardo has 
astutely noted here is the fact that the successes achieved by black elites in terms of 
institutional access were often deleterious to the movement.  Otherwise stated, access 
often meant cooptation of leadership with the end result being a surrendering of certain 
goals.  This cooptation was made possible by the fact that the movement was less 
formidable, a weakness that is attributable to fragmentation and a narrow support base. 
Framing Processes: The Indigenous Movement 
Contrasting the Afro-Colombian movement, Colombia’s indigenous population did not 
suffer from a rural-urban divide.  One source noted that the vast majority of indigenous 
people in Colombia lived in rural areas (Moreno, 2007), while another went a step 
further, demonstrating that almost 82 percent of indigenous people lived in the 
indigenous protected resguardos (Van Cott, 2005).  Thus, indigenous groups were able to 
avoid the pitfalls that are apt to occur when one must frame an ethnic movement around a 
diversity of desires, motivations, and class interests.  Most Indians could attach their own 
interests to the group desire for a set of interconnected rights; territorial (resguardos), 
cultural preservation (indigenous identity), and protection of resources.  Even diverse, 
national-level organizations with differing organizational structures were able to unite 
behind this set of shared issues.     
The ability to produce consistent framing and coherent objectives around key 
issues had positive effects on indigenous social movement organizations.  Local and 
regional affiliates that existed under larger organizations, while often from diverse tribal 
groups, were able to come together beyond the local level in moments of indigenous 
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need, often times under a larger organizational banner such as ONIC or AICO.  This 
represents a great contrast with the black movement.  There is also a contrast with 
Agudelo’s observation of the Liberal stronghold in the Pacific region.  Van Cott (2005) 
noted that the traditional parties had very little presence in indigenous regions of 
Colombia, thus the cooptation of leaders and the wrestling of the voting base was far less 
likely in these areas than it was in the Afro-Colombian Pacific.  That is not to suggest that 
some form of cooptation was not present in the former case.  Indeed there was some 
shifting of loyalties, a practice that often led to party switching.  Equally important is the 
fact that electoral success created animosity within organizations as actors sought to 
further their own political careers (Van Cott, 2005).  It appears, however, that indigenous 
actors had a greater say in how they would be coopted and institutionalized, selecting 
allies rather than simply surrendering to them.  This is confirmed by the fact that the 
consolidation of indigenous parties was aided by the ability of indigenous groups to 
expand support to non-ethnic sectors of society (Jackson, 2002).  This is most likely a 
function of the development of independent, electorally viable indigenous parties that 
were able to provide legitimate alternatives to the traditional power structures, not only 
for movement followers, but also for other unrepresented sectors (e.g. the left). 
To once again translate these observations directly to the concepts articulated by 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, it would appear that a more cohesive ethnic framing in the 
indigenous movement contributed to a greater connection among the collective vehicles 
(SMOs) through which indigenous actors mobilized and engaged in action.  That is to 
say, the development of broadly shared understandings, facilitated by the mostly rural 
demographic of adherents, led to the development of SMOs who did not struggle for 
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resources to the same degree as Afro-Colombian SMOs.  This unified character was 
accompanied by a mobilized ethnic voting base that gave elites proper motivation to 
remain faithful to the movement (reduction of personalist tendencies) and solidified 
ethnic parties as legitimate alternatives.  Thus, the form of institutionalization that 
occurred in this instance was one in which the movement had greater control over the 
terms of their inclusion.  The apparent result was less cooptation, greater acceptance of 
indigenous demands, and the development of independent leadership that could continue 
to champion ethnic demands through ethnic parties (Van Cott, 2005).  To be entirely 
clear, I do not assert that indigenous SMOs are homogenous in their ethnic 
representations, tactics, or organizational structures.  But their ability to connect around 
key issues during the ANC and at critical points in implementation have placed them in a 
better position to continue struggling behind a clearer, more widely accepted ethnic 
platform.  Without this, party consolidation would have been very unlikely. 
 
Indicators of Electoral Viability 
Despite the ability of the black leadership to successfully lobby for reserved ethnic seats 
in the chamber of representatives (Article 66, Law 70), the voting figures for this special 
district were indicative of the inability of black SMOs to translate their fragmented 
movement into a mobilized electorate.  The first round of legislative elections that 
featured reserved seats took place in 1994, roughly three years after the ANC and one 
year after the passage of Law 70.  When casting ballots, voters have can choose to vote 
for either their departmental district of the reserved district (indigenous or black), but not 
both.  Thus, a voter who votes for the black district can be viewed to value reserved black 
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representation as a path to responsive government.  Table 1 shows the results for the 1994 
legislative elections.  Of particular interest is the total number of votes that were cast for 
the special district.  This figure came to 131,207, which would amount to 3.25% of the 
total votes casted (approximately 5.58 million).  We would have to call this figure modest 
given the fact that the National Department of Administrative Statistics’ (DANE) 2007 
figures show that 21% of Colombia’s population is considered black.24  Softening the 
figure further is a comparison with the votes obtained by indigenous parties in the special 
senate district designated for that group.  Indigenous senate candidates received a total of 
108,119 votes while only making up roughly 2% of the national population.  This fact is 
striking and speaks volumes of the comparative ability to mobilize a voting base.  
Furthermore, the numbers in Table 2 demonstrate that even in departments where black 
Colombians make up a majority of the population (shown in all caps) gaining a large 
percentage of the votes casted was still elusive.  The department exhibiting the highest 
percentage was the Choco, an expected outcome considering the fact that the black 
population makes up over 90 percent of the total population (DANE).   
The state of affairs leading into the 1998 elections was as equally telling as the 
electoral outcomes.  A decision issued by the Colombian Constitutional Court in 
September of 1996 rendered the inclusion of reserved seats in Law 70 unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it had not been presented to the court for verification (Agudelo, 1999).25   
 
 
                                                 
24 There is an important caveat that should be attached to this statistic, however.  While many black 
Colombians are considered black in Colombian society, many do not self-identify as black.  This 
phenomenon complicates the ability of researchers to assess the percentage of blacks who do self-identify 
as such are voting along black ethnic lines. 
25 Just the section mandating reserved seats was deemed unconstitutional, the remainder of Law 70 was not 
subject to the same decision and remained in place. 
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Table 1.2: Total votes by candidate for the district for black communities, 1994 
legislative elections.  
 
Candidate Votes 
Zulia Mena 39,109 
Agustin Valencia 13,935 
E. Roberto Crabali 13,488 
Justiniano Quinones 11,112 
Cebedeo Carabali 9,191 
Arturo Grueso 8,304 
Rudesindo Castro 8,116 
Ventura Diaz 6,323 
Orlando E. Palacios 6,250 
Jesus M. Lucumi 5,737 
Jair Valencia 5,244 
Victor Leguizamon 4,398 
Total 131,207 
(Source: National Registry of Colombia) 
 
Table 1.3: Total votes for the district for black communities by department (top 
seven departments by percentage shown).  
 
Department Votes % of Total 
CHOCO 4,297 8.09% 
Bogota, D.F. 32,144 5.06% 
CAUCA 5,652 3.98% 
VALLE DEL CAUCA 20,020 3.55% 
NARINO 6,325 2.63% 
Guajira 2,017 2.42% 
Bolivar 7,028 2.40% 
(Source: National Registry of Colombia) 
  
 
One observer noted that equally responsible for the removal of the district for black 
communities was the poor performance of the two representatives elected to the offices in 
the 1994 election year.  The practical invisibility of these two public servants, both to 
other legislators and to the black communities who depended on their representation, 
made the removal of the district a non-event (Ibid).  This forced candidates of black 
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parties to compete on equal ground with the rest of the field, a circumstance which led 
various candidates to try their luck in the single-district senate race.  Table 3 shows the 
outcomes for the 6 candidates of black parties in the national senate race of 1998 in 
comparison with their figures from the 1994 chamber of representatives vote.  These 
figures show drastic drops in the black vote for almost all black movement candidates, 
with one (Agustin Valencia) performing almost on the same level as he had the previous 
cycle.  None of the candidates were elected to the Colombian senate.  It can be plausibly 
suggested that the figures presented in Table 3 are incomparable, as one takes place in the 
context of a lower house election while the other takes place in the upper house.  While 
this case can be made, it is also important to note that the voting structure of the reserved 
ethnic seats in the chamber of representatives takes place on a national level.  In other 
words, the candidates seeking election in the reserved district compete with all others on 
a national list of reserved seat candidates, and every voter across the nation has the same 
opportunity to vote on the reserved district as well.  Thus, reserved elections, much like 
the single-district senate election, are national in scope rather than departmental.  So, to 
be clear, the voting figures seen here represent the number of votes received nationally in 














Table 1.4: Votes for black party candidates for 1994 chamber election and 1998 
senate election. 
Candidate Total Votes 1994 
(Chamber) 
Total Votes 1998 (Senate) 
Zulia Mena 39,109 19,785 
Agustin Valencia 13,935 13,793 
Jair Valencia 5,244 3,395 
Smith Cordoba Did not participate 1,515 
Jesus Lucumi 5,737 1,325 
Carlos Rosero Did not participate 8,535 






















OBAPO No Data No Data No Data 
Agustín Valencia 
Mosquera 



























While no black parties have exhibited electoral success across multiple election 
cycles, even within their special district, this is not the case with indigenous parties.  
Since 1992, both the AICO (Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia) and ASI (Alianza 
                                                 
26 The system of preferential voting within lists was not put into place until the 2006 election cycle after the 
Political Reform of 2003 was passed. 
27 This figure is identical to the total list votes because Maria Isabel Urrutia Ocoro opted to present a closed 
list to voters. 
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Social Indigena) have maintained constant representation in congress (Moreno, 2007).  
There was also the appearance of the MIC (Movimiento Indigena Colombiano) during the 
1994 and 1998 elections.  The MIC consequently disappeared from the scene in 2002 
when ASI and AICO would once again become the two largest electoral forces (Ibid).  
Figure 4 shows the total votes casted for the special indigenous district of the Colombian 
senate.  We can easily observe an increase in total votes from 1994 to 2002 in the amount 
of 134,149.  We also see that indigenous parties were not dependent on the ethnic district 
for representation, gaining more than the allotted seats in 3 out of 4 election cycles.   
 It has been noted elsewhere that non-indigenous parties have tried to incorporate 
indigenous candidates into their lists in order to harness some of the electoral power of 
this ethnic group (Moreno, 2007).  This development can be viewed in two ways; we can 
perceive it as an attempted cooptation of the indigenous movement or we can identify it 
as an indicator of an abundance of qualified indigenous candidates who are seeking other 
avenues of election away from the controls of entities like AICO and ASI.  It should also 
be noted that these two perceptions may not be mutually exclusive of each other.  Despite 
the swallowing of parts of the movement, indigenous parties continue to exhibit a lasting 
quality and continue to be electorally viable parties, whether through an indigenous 
voting base or by gaining the support of non-indigenous sectors of society (Moreno, 
2007).  Movements toward the latter form of support are indicative of parties that have 
indigenous foundations and beginnings but who seek to become “supraethnic” in nature, 
thereby transcending the specificity of ethnicity (Ibid).  Regardless of how we choose to 
interpret the above voting figures, the basic outcome is clear: indigenous parties have 
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been able to capitalize on the opportunities brought on by structural crises, newly 
perceived threats, and institutional realignment.   
 
 Table 1.6: Total indigenous party votes for reserved senate district by year. 
Election Year Total Indigenous Votes Additional Senate Seats28 
1994 108,119 0 
1998 150,281 1 
2002 242,268 2 
2006 157,585 1 
 (Source: National Registry of Colombia) 
 
Table 1.7: Candidates elected to special senate district for indigenous 
communities and party affiliation. 
Legislative 
Period 
Representatives Party or 
Movement 



























As is the case with most studies, this one exhibits some considerable limitations.  
Knowledgeable readers may fairly question the assumption of a constant opportunity 
                                                 
28 This column denotes the number of senate seats acquired by indigenous candidates beyond the two 
reserved seats.   
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structure across the two movements.  I should comment that a common opportunity 
structure is derived as a ‘best-guess’ variable, and a simplistic one.  This means that I 
have taken a basic, simplified understanding of political opportunity structure, theorizing 
it as the availability of access points in the political system.  Other factors such as the 
environments influence on political claims, the state’s propensity for repression, and the 
temporal location of the movement itself have been omitted.  The justification for such a 
move was to isolate the framing and mobilization variables in order to better understand 
the movements themselves rather than the structures that operated in their environment.  
The constitutional reform process and the ANC are occurrences which make such a 
formulation of opportunity justifiable.  These processes are the access points that altered 
“the configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group’s political environment that 
influences that group’s assertion of its political claims” (Brockett, 1991: 254, cited in 
Foweraker, 1995:71).  It is my assertion that the extent to which movement’s capitalized 
on this access is determined greatly by mobilization and framing rather than the greater 
details of the opportunity structure. 
 It is also quite possible that the question presented here may have benefited from 
a localized analysis.  That is to say, it may be unfair to assess movements solely based on 
national representation.  Moreover, the link between local interests and national party 
representation is arguable, a fact that supports calls for local analysis.  The greatest 
hindrance preventing such an analysis was reliable access to local information across 
elections and for all of the important municipalities.  Moreover, the level of detail 
necessary to make a comparison at such a level, without the benefit of field research, 
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would have undoubtedly proven to be a difficult obstacle to overcome.  It is for this 
reason that national data and reserved representation became the foci of comparison. 
The national electoral outcomes that have been observed exhibit striking 
contrasts.  Black organizations have not been able to translate the institutional aperture 
into the formation of electorally viable parties while indigenous groups have been quite 
successful in doing so, all the while comprising a far smaller percentage of the 
Colombian population.  But if the political opportunity structure is constant, we are still 
at a loss as to why this is the case.  To repeat, it is my contention here that the black 
movement suffered from incoherent framing, an issue that led to fragmentation of those 
organizations.  This, in turn, hampered the ability of Afro-Colombians to mobilize a 
dependable, loyal electorate.  In contrast, indigenous actors were able to frame their 
movement along ethnic lines with great success and alongside a coherent set of demands.  
The result was superior mobilization of loyal supporters and the continued visibility of 
dominant indigenous parties.   
A key part of issuing claims to government is first establishing their legitimacy, 
not only vis-à-vis the state, but also for political followers.  Followers of any particular 
social movement must be moved to action by an identification with a commonly agreed 
upon set of goals and demands that they seek to gain from government.  It also follows 
that the state’s perception of this common understanding is critical to a group’s ability to 
substantiate their claims and achieve their collective goals, all aided by an enhanced 
organizational capacity and resource mobilization.  It is often unclear why some groups 
are able to construct a unified movement while others fail in this regard.  In the case of 
Colombian ethnic movements, the demographic circumstances of the two main ethnic 
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movements placed one in a position to experience complications in framing the 
movement while facilitating unified framing in the counter-example.  The diversity of 
desires, goals, and perceptions of race within the Afro-Colombian movement made a 
cohesive framing difficult to sustain over a long period of time.  The result was a diverse 
set of organizations that experienced only effervescent moments of unity.   
 It has been noted elsewhere that in Latin America “the defense of ‘autonomy’ is 
often an attempt to distance contemporary movements from the political manipulation” of 
traditional political powers while “the notion of autonomy serves more general 
ideological purposes” (Foweraker, 1995).  Indigenous SMOs were able to lock their 
attention into issues of autonomy, resource control, and cultural preservation.  This was 
the source of their unified message to both followers and the state.  Thus, by carrying this 
message indigenous populations achieve a great deal, including the ability to distance 
themselves from traditional power structures and be selective about how their demands 
would be integrated into state institutions.  This produced a lasting movement with 
independent and capable leaders, as well as powerful allies.  These conditions were 
conducive to greater success in comparison with Afro-Colombians. 
 Many would posit that increasing rates of violence and displacement are also key 
causal factors for the lack of a more palpable black agenda.  While this observation has 
some traction, we should also note that indigenous organizations such as OREWA have 
found ways to flourish in the same Chocó province that is inhabited by a large black 
population.  CRIC, an organization which has been shown to have electoral success in the 
past, has its home in the Cauca province, an area that has experienced a great deal of 
activity from both paramilitary and guerilla combatants. Thus, positing violence against 
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black populations as a major cause of the observed lack of black political organization 
seems insufficient, as indigenous people have not been spared these unfortunate 
occurrences.  In fact, if we reposition the discussion we may see this as a possible benefit 
to black organizations.  Asher (2009) notes that the increase in the number of black 
communities displaced by violence has been an issue around which the various black 
sectors described here have been able to coalesce.  This has led to an increase in 
international support (human rights networks, churches, and solidarity groups) that has 
given greater visibility of black politics in Colombia (Asher, 2009).  “As displaced Afro-
Colombians face new forms of discrimination and invisibility, there is a resurgence in 
activism against racial discrimination, as well as for socioeconomic and political 
equality” (Ibid: 155).  Oddly, these tragedies may provide the black movement with a 
new set of demands that might link them with key allies who identify with the issues 
brought about by displacement. 
 It remains to be determined whether or not the diverging character of the two 
movements has led to vast differences in the formation of electorally viable ethnic parties 
at the local, regional, and national level.  Of equal importance is the need to study what 
the programmatic impact of a less mobilized movement might be.  This would entail 
analyzing the success of ethnic elected officials and social movement organizations to 
influence legislation that improved the lives of black and indigenous people.  Thus, the 
new questions would focus upon the translation of the movements into descriptive 
representation in state institutions and whether or not that descriptive representation 
indeed exhibited substantive results.  In this vein, future study should be cognizant of the 
double-edged sword that is electoral politics, particularly for indigenous groups that have 
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exhibited success.  It has been noted that the indigenous elite can begin to increase the 
“adjudication of the traditional,” possibly leading to a diminishing of traditional authority 
(Dover and Rappaport, 1996).  Otherwise stated, electoral struggles informed by a 
national indigenous agenda may be deleterious to the authority of indigenous 
communities.  It is obvious that party consolidation is hardly the end of the road for 
ethnic strife. 
 The inability of black communities to sustain a cohesive movement is largely 
attributable of a failure to develop a unified framing, particularly in terms of how 
“blackness” was to be politicized at the national level.  This circumstance resulted from 
two key factors: a rural-urban divide and the resulting fragmentation of black social 
movement organizations.  That is not to suggest that the indigenous movement was 
devoid of internal strains due to competition and diversity.  This would obfuscate the true 
history of that movement and belie their tendency to be internally democratic, a 
circumstance which inevitably breeds some level of internal division.  However, an 
agreement across the movement of basic ideology and objectives led to a greater display 
of support and organization across organizations, thus restricting the damage of 
sectarianism.  This support, again while not entirely absent, was far less cohesive in the 
case of Afro-Colombian organizations, a dearth that precipitated the inability of these 
actors to broaden their original grassroots approaches and join forces in united-action 
fronts.  As Fals Borda (1992) rightfully indicates, the survival of movements across Latin 
America was dependent on the ability to “link one protest or struggle for rights or 
services to another, to look for steadfast allies of different social backgrounds, and the 
form networks of mutual support and coordination at several levels.”  It is these links 
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between indigenous groups that led to cultural action in larger, regional and national 
arenas.  The ultimate result was the resistance of large levels of cooptation and eventually 
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